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IDOLATRY 
AND ITS  DISCONTENTS
C
ontemporary art has long claimed the privilege—indeed, 
the duty—of criticizing the images produced by the mass-
culture industry.1 Now, however, both media images and 
works of art are increasingly coming under attack for religious 
reasons. It often seems as if Islamist fundamentalism has effectively 
conspired with the Western media and their Enlightenment rhetoric to 
create a culture war that perpetuates itself from one event to the next. 
These events (and pseudo-events) range from the dramatic murder 
of Dutch ﬁlmmaker Theo van Gogh to the Danish cartoon riots, Jack 
Straw’s remarks on veils and the decision of the Deutsche Oper in Berlin 
to cancel a planned staging of Mozart’s Idomeneo—in which the severed 
heads of Jesus, Mohammed and Buddha were to be shown alongside 
that of Poseidon. Sometimes there need be no event at all: media reports 
that some British banks no longer hand out piggy banks to children, so 
as not to offend Muslim customers, turned out to be just as unfounded 
as the end-of-year hysteria over the alleged banning of Christmas by 
overzealous, politically correct bureaucrats and managers. 
So far, the art world has shown little inclination—at least on the insti-
tutional level—to respond to such real or perceived challenges to the 
spectacular regime of visibility that it is itself so keen on exposing. 
Nonetheless, individual artistic practices offer compelling reﬂections 
on the renewed vigour of monotheistic attacks on images and on the 
visual regime of the capitalist West as such; I focus here on Dutch exam-
ples, but within the broader context of the global religious contestation 
of the spectacle.
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Many of the most prominent incidents in the current image wars involve 
the veiling or unveiling of the female body. In 2003, an Amsterdam 
tenement was decorated with a monumental mural of a nude woman, 
inspired by a poem by Jacob van Lennep, Ode aan een roosje (‘Ode to a 
Rose’), which was splashed across the façade and the body of the woman; 
a clothed man, presumably the author, ﬂoated over the text and the wom-
an’s legs. Although the inhabitants of the neighbouring buildings, many 
of them Muslims, were polled prior to the work’s execution (apparently 
with largely positive results), once completed the mural was attacked 
both verbally and physically, with black paint. In the end, a compromise 
was reached: the woman’s pubic area was pixellated, turning it into an 
abstract grid. The ideological opposite of such revealing public art can 
be found in the town of Susa, Iran, in the form of a mural showing the 
upper part of a woman in Islamic dress, her face visible but her body 
concealed, her eyes demurely averted. An accompanying text proclaims: 
‘A woman modestly dressed is as a pearl in it’s shell’ [sic].2
Over the past few years, the appearance of women who adhere to a strict 
deﬁnition of hijab dress in European cities has provoked increasing con-
troversy. This focuses above all on the veiling of the face, with only a slit 
left for the eyes—or even less, as in the Afghan burqa, which covers the 
eyes with an embroidered grille. After a group of Muslims who allegedly 
plotted to kidnap and kill a British Muslim soldier on leave from Iraq 
were arrested in early 2007, British newspapers showed a photo of three 
veiled women in Birmingham, one of them making a V-sign. Although 
this is an extreme case, images of veiled women have become a minor 
genre in European newspapers—one indication that the veil has come to 
function as a screen on which cultural anxieties and desires are projected, 
and not just from one side. This is not the place to explore the cultural 
history of the veil, which reaches back before the beginnings of Islam 
or Christianity, and often has social rather than religious connotations; 
nor to engage in the debate over whether the veil is actually prescribed 
by Islam, or is just a cultural habit; whether it is a means of oppression, 
or a choice made by strong and emancipated women. The fact is that the 
polysemic veil has become a logotype of the dangerous Muslim other; 
1 A revised version of this essay will appear in the forthcoming Citizens and Subjects: 
The Netherlands, for example, edited by Maria Hlavajova, Rosi Braidotti and Charles 
Esche, as part of the Dutch contribution to the 2007 Venice Biennale.
2 I know the Susa mural through a photo taken by Frank Denys.
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it has become a prop in today’s image wars. Islamists use it as a highly 
visible statement of their ability to protect Muslim values in the face of 
an antagonistic Western culture, while Western liberals perceive it as 
an attack on such a culture, often focusing on the question of women’s 
rights. In this respect they follow in the footsteps of the far-from-lib-
eral Lord Cromer, British consul-general in Egypt in the late nineteenth 
century, who already ideologized the veil as a sign of the oppression of 
women. This reading at least has the virtue of being open to appropria-
tion by Muslim women: a Dutch news photograph taken in late 2006 
shows the full-body veil being used by Muslim women in a protest against 
their deportation to Afghanistan, where they would be forced to wear 
such burqas—they have wrapped themselves not only in burqas, but in 
pictures of the then Immigration Minister Rita Verdonk, or ‘Iron Rita’. 
The status of the veil as a media myth that would have delighted Roland 
Barthes—the veil as sign for Oriental mystery and danger, hiding an 
inaccessible, exotic feminine body—has been countered by (mainly 
female) artists including Shirin Neshat and Zineb Sedira.3 The Dutch 
artist Fransje Killaars, who in the early 1990s switched from painting to 
making installations with textiles, has recently taken to draping some of 
her bedspreads, with their brightly coloured grids, on tailor’s dummies. 
These abstract and impractical full-body veils draw attention to their 
materiality and sensuality—to their own surface and texture rather than 
their status as obstructions of the gaze, as a hindrance to seeing what 
lies beneath. Titled Figures and posed in groups, they form a constel-
lation that invites comparison and contrast. Killaars also shows one or 
two dummies that are not covered in the manner of a burqa, but around 
which a bedspread is draped from the neck down in the manner of a 
cape. In contrast to the burqa forms, the ‘cape’ Figures use dummies 
whose heads have been removed; the cape is crowned by nothing. By 
‘exposing’ the veiled face as a void, these acéphales join the other works 
in privileging the cover over the covered, the veil over the veiled. If the 
media represent the veil as a blot that obscures the essence, the woman 
beneath—a woman supposedly in need of unveiling to make her free—
Killaars’s Figures make the veil visible as something integral rather than 
exterior to the ﬁgure. 
3 See various contributions in the exhibition catalogue Veil: Veiling, Representation 
and Contemporary Art, London and Cambridge, ma 2003. The concept of the 
exhibition was Zineb Sedira’s.
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Important as work such as Killaars’s is, there is no denying that it 
remains marginal in a culture in which the veil has been hijacked by 
right-wing mouthpieces who routinely invoke the Enlightenment in a 
way that reduces critique to neatly packaged dogma for the age of the 
soundbite. One such Enlightenment fundamentalist is Somali-born 
Ayaan Hirsi Ali, who during her years in Holland—she has since 
moved on to the us, to work at the neoconservative American Enterprise 
Institute—wrote the script for a short ﬁlm on the role of women in Islam. 
Programmatically titled Submission (part 1), the 2004 ﬁlm was directed 
by Theo van Gogh, who famously described Muslims as backward 
‘goat-fuckers’; he paid with his life for Submission when he was stabbed 
to death on an Amsterdam street in broad daylight by a young funda-
mentalist now famous as Mohammed B. Submission shows a woman 
wearing a dark but transparent veil that reveals parts of her body, upon 
which Koranic verses on woman’s submissive role have been written in 
ornate calligraphy. The ﬁlm’s voice-over monologue contains harrowing 
stories of various forms of abuse, and depicts the veil as a prison, the 
innermost circle of an extremely restricted world. The element of truth 
in this is compromized by the reduction of the veil, of its ambiguity and 
contradictions, to a cartoon image. Turning women wearing veils into 
the faceless face of otherness allows Hirsi Ali and her allies to ignore the 
questions raised by the rise of the veil in Europe—questions that can be 
uncomfortable for the heroic defenders of western liberal values.
Mid-twentieth-century pioneers of radical Islamism such as Sayyid Qutb 
of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood saw capitalist culture as the return 
of jahiliyya, the paganism of pre-Islamic Arabia. This pagan state was 
characterized by shirk, the associating of other gods or beings with Allah; 
shirk functions as an equivalent of Judaic or Christian conceptions of 
idolatry. Like idolatrous Rome for the Christians, the jahiliyya was also 
associated with uncontrolled and promiscuous sexuality; indeed, the 
early Jewish conception of idolatry frequently compared it to adultery. 
Ever since Sayyid Qutb, the comparative sexual freedom and sexualiza-
tion of the public sphere have been regarded as crucial symptoms of 
the new Western idolatry. Not only is thought itself turned into an idol 
by Western rationalists, as Qutb stated with horror; sinking even lower, 
the Westerners also idolize the body. But then, perhaps this is just a 
front for the true idolatry: as the Iranian thinker Ali Shariati stated, in 
an idiom that may seem oddly familiar, sexual freedom is ‘part of a new 
exploitation, a type of limitless deception, which the impure system of 
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Western capitalism produces’. Behind the seductive appearance of com-
modiﬁed sexuality lie ‘great idols and the three faces of the contemporary 
religious trinity: exploitation, colonialism and despotism’.4 
By blending Islamic phraseology with that of Marxist political theory, 
of which he is critical even while using it against capitalism, Shariati 
reappropriated and resacralized a discourse that itself appropriated and 
transformed Jewish and Christian elements. Today’s European and 
American Enlightenment fundamentalists, who specialize in using a 
critique of Islam and of Muslim societies to deﬂect attention from the 
West’s destructive political, military and economic operations, attempt to 
disavow any link between religion and the ‘Western values’ they claim to 
represent. However, the Enlightenment is scarcely thinkable without the 
monotheistic critique of idolatry; nor, for that matter, are modern critical 
theory or artistic practice. The symbolic gesture of ‘unveiling the truth’, 
which has been so popular since the Enlightenment, is indebted to this 
heritage—and the use of the veil in contemporary Islamism, paradoxical 
as it may seem, can itself be seen as following rather than breaking the 
logic of unveiling.5 Is the veil not effectively being used to unmask and 
lay bare the limits of Western liberalism—to reveal it as a sham, an ideol-
ogy in the service of capitalist powers? 
As theorists and historians of iconoclasm gleefully point out, iconoclasts 
also create new images; contemporary practitioners like the Taliban are 
media-savvy enough to be fully aware of this dialectic, and to exploit it.6 
As used by Islamists, the veil is iconoclastic, an attack on the idolatrous 
adoration of the human body in the West. When artist Lidwien Van de 
Ven engaged with the ubiquitous iconography of the veil in her work, two 
forms of iconoclasm were deployed. In an exhibition in Paris in 2006, 
Van de Ven showed a photo she had taken outside the French embassy 
in London, showing veiled women protesting against the anti-veil ruling 
for French schools. This and other images were pasted directly onto the 
4 Ali Shariati, Fatima is Fatima, Tehran 1981, ch. 5.
5 On the Enlightenment iconography of unveiling Isis (mysterious nature), see Jan 
Assmann, Moses der Ägypter. Entzifferung einer Gedächtnisspur, Frankfurt 2000, 
pp. 188–96.
6 For a routinely and somewhat tiresomely provocative take on Islamist terrorists as 
iconophiles who reinforce rather than attack the belief in images, see Boris Groys, 
‘The Fate of Art in the Age of Terror’, in Bruno Latour and Peter Weibel, eds, 
Making Things Public, Karlsruhe 2005, pp. 970–5.
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wall; in the second stage of the exhibition, they were washed over with a 
thin coat of white paint that allowed the images to shine through. Both 
obscuring the photographed veils and giving them a new visibility, Van 
de Ven endowed the media myth with an ambiguously physical, and at 
the same time unreal and ethereal, status. Van de Ven’s gentle artistic 
iconoclasm makes the underlying image visible again—visible as repre-
senting not stubborn or stupid backwardness, but an iconoclastic act in 
its own right; an act whose religious as well as political nature needs to 
be addressed, rather than sociologized or pathologized. 
From one spectacle to another
The protests occasioned by the Danish cartoons of the prophet 
Mohammed reﬂected anger (however manipulated) not only at the fact 
that Mohammed was caricatured, but at the fact that he was depicted at 
all. After all, this is a breach of the ban on depicting the prophet which is 
derived from a certain interpretation of the Mosaic ban on idolatry. The 
current image wars represent a new wave of the monotheistic idolatry 
critique enshrined in the Second Commandment in Exodus 20:4, forbid-
ding graven images ‘or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, 
or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth’. 
This is elaborated upon in Deuteronomy 4:15–19, where the Israelites 
are reminded that they ‘saw no manner of similitude on the day that 
the lord spake unto you in Horeb out of the midst of the ﬁre’, and that 
representations of people and animals should be avoided because they 
might lead to ‘corruption’, to worshipping of these images (a similar 
danger existing in the case of the sun, moon and stars).7 There are, in 
effect, two prohibitions: God must not be represented; nor must living 
creatures, planets or anything else that might be worshipped, so as to 
avoid idolatry. But the ﬁrst error, or sin, is idolatry as well. Idolatry is 
not only the worship of false gods but also the worship of Jehovah in an 
image; the image itself becomes a false god.8 At ﬁrst, worshipping other 
gods was a real temptation; later, when this was no longer a danger, 
idolatrous tendencies within Jewish monotheism were seen as a risk. 
7 Different religions count the Commandments in differing ways. In Judaism and 
most Protestant churches, the ban on idolatry is part of the Second Commandment; 
in Catholicism, it is subsumed under the First.
8 Edwyn Bevan, Holy Images: An Inquiry into Idolatry and Image-Worship in Ancient 
Paganism and in Christianity, London 1940, p. 39.
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In practice, the degree to which images were made and the way in which 
they were used over the centuries varied widely in the Jewish religion, 
as well as in Christianity and in Islam. The Christian doctrine of the 
Incarnation mitigated the ban on the depiction of God and his creation; 
God had become man, the word had become ﬂesh, and therefore open 
to depiction. Of course, Byzantine iconoclasts and Protestants argued 
that such images could still be put to idolatrous use, sometimes adding 
that images of Christ could only represent one of his two natures—the 
physical one, not his divinity. The Muslim fear of a relapse into shirk, 
the ‘associating’ of other deities or powers with God, manifests itself 
in a rather extreme ban on tasweer, images that might stimulate such 
idolatry. However, although contemporary Western as well as Islamist 
ideologues are intent on making Islam appear monolithic, the ban on 
depicting Mohammed was also subject to successive waves of radicaliza-
tion and relaxation; it is not as absolute as some contemporary ideologists 
suggest, as quite a number of old miniatures show.9 The repression of 
such unwelcome historical complexities allows fundamentalists to cre-
ate a Manichean dichotomy between Islam and the idolatrous West—the 
new jahiliyya. This discourse can be seen as a more radical form of the 
Christian critique of Western culture. 
For Christians, the Roman empire remained the paradigm of an idola-
trous society. Roman games in particular had been attacked by Tertullian 
in his De Spectaculis as prime examples of eidolatreia, and the fascina-
tion with Roman spectacle and decadence in late nineteenth-century 
and early twentieth-century culture, from the paintings of Gérome and 
Alma-Tadema to later ﬁlm productions, suggested that modern soci-
ety might be a Rome returned—the triumph of idolatry disguised by 
Christian rhetoric. However, the Christian criticism of capitalist moder-
nity was increasingly supplanted by a secularized discourse hailing from 
the Enlightenment and shaped by, yet also transforming and transcend-
ing, its monotheistic roots. In Du Culte des dieux fétiches (1760), a text 
that encapsulates the Enlightenment’s transformation of monotheistic 
topoi into instruments of secular critique, Charles de Brosses claimed to 
unveil the most primitive form of religion, the embryonic ﬁrst stirrings 
of idolatry: fetishism, or the worship of random objects rather than stat-
ues or other man-made images. Although the Enlightenment subjected 
9 See the ‘Mohammed Image archive’, at www.zombietime.com.
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religious dogma to an open-ended critique, this opposition of dogma 
and critique should not obscure the fact that the gestures of ‘revealing’ 
gods to be idols and long-held truths to be superstitions are funda-
mentally the same, and that monotheistic discourse on pagan religion 
constituted a nascent form of critique—an idolatry critique transformed 
by the modern critique of religions and society. Religious dogmatism 
already contained the seeds of critique, just as critique may still be cru-
cially dependent on dogma. 
In a letter written shortly after Theodor Adorno’s death, in which he 
attempted to explain why his friend had not been buried according to 
Jewish rites, Max Horkheimer claimed that critical theory was based 
on the Second Commandment—the ban on representations of God, 
or, in more fundamentalist interpretations, on representation of all 
living beings.10 Modern critical theory, in other words, analysed and 
opposed fascism and the culture industry as latter-day idolatry. Although 
Horkheimer’s remark was obviously made during highly emotional 
circumstances, it is true that the modern critique of representation is in 
many ways a transformation of the monotheistic discourse on idolatry: 
the divine Commandment fostered a suspicious and critical mentality 
that was ﬁnally turned against dogma itself. From De Brosses to Marx 
and beyond, the concept of the fetish as a primitive precursor of the idol 
still derives from monotheistic idolatry critique; Marx, of course, turned 
De Brosses’s African proto-idol into a capitalist commodity fetish, just 
as irrational and mystifying. However, in contrast to ‘idols’ according to 
monotheism, such fetishes are seen as a betrayal of what true human-
ity might be, rather than as transgressions of divine law. The difference 
between an early Christian diatribe such as Tertullian’s De Spectaculis 
and Debord’s Marxian treatise on The Society of the Spectacle is immense, 
even if the latter is indebted—however indirectly—to the former. 
Jeroen De Rijke and Willem De Rooij’s ﬁlm Of Three Men (1998) con-
stitutes a montage—a possible dialogue—between the two forms of 
idolatry critique, religious and secular. The ﬁlm shows the interior of 
an Amsterdam mosque that was formerly a Catholic church, built in 
the 1920s in a rather bulky and sober modernist-historicist style. The 
10 Max Horkheimer, letter to Otto Herz, September 1, 1969, in Max Horkheimer, 
Gesammelte Schriften vol. 18: Briefwechsel 1949–1973, Frankfurt 1996, p. 743.
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interior has been stripped of its Catholic paraphernalia; chandeliers and 
a bare ﬂoor complete the visual transformation. The ﬁlm mostly focuses 
on the changing effects of the light coming through the windows; this 
light is largely artiﬁcial, and changes quickly. There is an obvious con-
nection with seventeenth-century paintings, by Saenredam and others, 
depicting the whitewashed interiors of Protestant churches that were 
once Catholic, and highly painted. Whereas representations of such puri-
ﬁed spaces are effortlessly contemplated for their aesthetic qualities, the 
image of a mosque sabotages such contemplation. In today’s Europe, 
after all, mosques are often regarded with a wary eye. By treating the 
space in a formal way, as a receptacle for a light show, De Rijke and De 
Rooij suggest that a mosque too is a potential place of enlightenment—or 
Enlightenment—and reﬂection, just like those former Dutch churches 
that now function as cultural centres or spaces of debate. 
In addition to overlaying a church and a mosque with their diverging 
connotations, Of Three Men also juxtaposes seventeenth-century picto-
rial representations of spaces created by iconoclastic fury with the black 
screen’s re-enactment of modern artistic iconoclasm. Before the mosque 
is shown, at the beginning of the ﬁlm, the image is black; then it appears 
that the camera’s view has been blocked by some men in dark cloaks. 
While this recalls the occasional Hollywood practice of disguising cuts 
by having black clothing or some dark object momentarily block the 
view, its length and position at the beginning of the ﬁlm also recall mod-
ern artistic iconoclasm—for example Debord’s ﬁrst ﬁlm, Hurlements en 
faveur de Sade (1952), which contains long stretches of complete black-
ness. One need not accept Clement Greenberg’s story of the Kantian 
origins and smooth progression of modernism to acknowledge mod-
ern art’s self-critical bent—which also enables it to reﬂect on its own 
iconoclastic elements, and iconoclasm in general.11 A 2006 installation 
by Krijn de Koning and Gert Jan Kocken combined three of Kocken’s 
photographs of traces of iconoclastic rage in Dutch churches, show-
ing mutilated stone reliefs, with a De Koning mural surrounding those 
pictures. Consisting of an irregular, meandering blue-and-white geo-
metric pattern, the mural spreads out over the walls and ceiling like a 
bulky modernist ornament. Once more a montage of iconoclasms and 
11 Clement Greenberg, ‘Modernist Painting’ [1960], in Greenberg, The Collected 
Essays and Criticism 4: Modernism with a Vengeance, London and Chicago 1993, 
pp. 85–93.
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critiques is effected, setting the stage for a possible debate that would 
confound ‘war on terror’ verities. 
Against visibility 
If the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation legitimized the creation of a 
rich visual culture, the growing autonomy of this culture from religion 
and its integration into the emerging capitalist culture industry of the 
nineteenth century fuelled fears of a relapse into idolatry. Lew Wallace, 
author of Ben-Hur, the story of a Jewish prince whose life intersects at 
various points with that of Jesus, decided against the direct portrayal of 
Jesus in dramatic versions of his novel. Thus in the 1925 ﬁlm adaptation, 
we see a Last Supper scene directly inspired by Renaissance paintings, 
Leonardo’s Last Supper mural in particular, except for the fact that the 
sight of the centrally seated Christ is blocked by a lone Apostle sitting 
in front of him. All the viewer sees of Jesus is a halo and some hands. 
Possibly the ﬁgure in the foreground is Judas, who was often set apart 
from the others in Medieval and Renaissance paintings—but who was 
not, of course, placed in front of Christ. What made representations of 
Christ particularly sensitive in the context of Ben-Hur screenings was 
their character as commercial—even if devout—spectacles, complete 
with chariot races. It is no surprise that Muslim ﬁlm directors took an 
even more radical stance on the issue of depicting Mohammed: in a 1976 
ﬁlm version of the life of Mohammed and the rise of Islam, The Message, 
director Moustapha Akkad scrupulously adhered to the ban on represent-
ing the prophet, instead choosing a rather risqué method of integrating 
Mohammed into the narrative—at certain moments, the use of subjective 
camera-angles makes the viewer see things through Mohammed’s eyes.
Not only Muslims, but strict Protestants too have long struggled with 
the rise of modern image reproduction; the ‘dictatorship of visibility’ in 
today’s media-saturated society multiplies the risk of idolatry. The radical 
Calvinist opposition to this dictatorship is commemorated in a 2003 video 
by Arnoud Holleman, which shows girls in the Dutch Calvinist enclave 
of Staphorst ducking away and hiding their faces when they realize they 
are being ﬁlmed. In this appropriation and editing of 1950s ﬁlm footage, 
Holleman elegantly recalls that a radical rejection of being portrayed, of 
being subjected to the dictatorship of visibility, is not some strange and 
exotic recent import from the east. And of course mainstream Muslim 
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scholars’ judgements, or fatwas, have long opposed the fundamentalist 
rejection of photography, ﬁlm and video on theological grounds:
Photography as a medium of communication or for the simple, innocent 
retention of memories without the taint of reverence/shirk does not fall 
under the category of forbidden Tasweer. One ﬁnds a number of traditions 
from the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, condemning people 
who make Tasweer, which denotes painting or carving images or statues. It 
was closely associated with paganism or shirk . . . In other words, Tasweer 
was forbidden precisely for the reason that it was a means leading to shirk. 
The function of photography today does not fall under the above category. 
Even some of the scholars who had been once vehemently opposed to photo-
graphy under the pretext that it was a form of forbidden Tasweer have later 
changed their position on it—as they allow even for their own pictures to be 
taken and published in newspapers, for videotaping lectures and for pres-
entations; whereas in the past, they would only allow it in exceptional cases 
such as passports, drivers’ licenses, etc. The change in their view of photog-
raphy is based on their assessment of the role of photography.12 
However, photography can certainly be abused: ‘To take pictures of 
leaders and heroes and hang them on the walls may not belong to the 
same category of permission. This may give rise to a feeling of rever-
ence and hero worship, which was precisely the main thrust of the 
prohibition of Tasweer.’ In fact, the cult of ‘martyrs’ (suicide bombers) 
whose images are widely disseminated as models indicates that con-
temporary Islamist terrorists fully participate in the spectacle, eagerly 
producing images of destruction and embracing the dialectic of icono-
clasm, in which destruction begets new—but unsettling—images. The 
media- and iconophobic Taliban took care to document the destruction 
of the giant Bamiyan Buddha sculptures. However, artist Sean Snyder 
has made the intriguing suggestion that image production by radical 
Islamists may still be deliberately iconoclastic; the bad technical quality 
of videos produced by Al-Qaeda may be intentional; far from primitive, 
these videos would be actively primitivist, opposing ‘poor’ images to the 
glitzy Western spectacle.13 
12 Fatwa by Sheikh Ahmad Kutty of the Islamic Institute of Toronto, available at 
www.islamonline.net.
13 Sean Snyder, ‘Some Byproducts: Thoughts on the Visual Rhetoric of psyop’, 
Maria Hlavajova and Jill Winder, eds, Concerning War: A Critical Reader, Utrecht 
and Frankfurt 2006, p. 185.
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In 2002, Arnoud Holleman was one of the editors of an issue of Re-
Magazine that masqueraded as the Spring 2007 issue. In a series of 
entries dating from the distant past through the 1980s and 1990s to the 
future (from a 2002 perspective), a nameless ‘we’ reﬂected on various 
public and private events, culminating in a decision to eschew images; a 
decision dated, tellingly, to the year 2001, the year of 9/11 and the begin-
ning of the end of the iconophobic Taliban regime. ‘We couldn’t cope 
with the absence of pictures. It created irrational fears. We couldn’t see 
what was happening in Afghanistan. We needed images.’ While this still 
reﬂects the general Western attitude, the ‘we’ soon make an iconoclastic 
turn of their own: ‘Everything was image and nobody asked himself or 
herself why the ban was being violated. As an experiment, we covered 
or removed all images from our home. It cleared our heads. We asked 
friends to do the same.’ In the end, this apparent iconophobia may be at 
the service of an intensiﬁed perception of images: ‘We need the absence 
of images to appreciate the quality of an image when we see one.’14 This 
iconoclasm, an ‘internalized form of the Second Commandment’ that 
is not explicitly religious, searches for ‘an alternative to the maelstrom 
of visual culture’.15
According to the Marxian analysis of Debord, the spectacle is not a mat-
ter of images or of media technology per se, but of the capitalist mode 
of production leading to the fetishistic projection of social life onto com-
modities, lived reality becoming a reiﬁed representation. As if to prove 
that he was no iconophobe, Debord turned the second volume of his 
autobiographical book Panegyric into a collection of pictures, noting 
that he appreciated images which have not been ‘artiﬁcially separated 
from their meaning’. Although his stated intention of using pictures as 
‘iconographic proof’ to illustrate a ‘true discourse’ betrays a secularized 
Christian desire to prevent images becoming too independent from the 
word, the pictures in Panegyric, all relating to Debord’s life and work, 
nonetheless develop a pull of their own.16 Minimizing the number of 
images in the ‘2007’ issue of Re-Magazine, which only contains a few 
photo sequences interspersed among the pages of text, Holleman and his 
14 Preceding quotations in this paragraph all from Re-Magazine #23, Spring 2007 
(2002), unpaginated.
15 Arnoud Holleman, ‘The Second Commandment’, text distributed at the Stedelijk 
Museum as part of Holleman’s contribution to the group show Just in Time, 
2006.
16 Guy Debord, Panegyric, London 2004.
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collaborators question precisely the production of images separated from 
their meaning—images that veil rather than reveal, or veil by revealing. 
Recently, Bruno Latour and others have zoomed in on the relationship 
between monotheistic idolatry critique and modern secular critique in 
order to discredit both: if, on the one hand, the monotheistic critique 
leads to iconoclastic violence while, on the other hand, secular critique 
has undergone inﬂation and degenerated into a habit, should not critique 
as such be treated with suspicion? Is not the whole rhetoric of unveiling 
the truth and destroying idols, fetishes and myths dubious and danger-
ous?17 While it is undeniable that ‘criticality’ is prone to becoming its own 
simulation, it would be the height of bad timing to abandon critique at 
a moment when both religious fundamentalists and the self-proclaimed 
defenders of the Enlightenment use their respective versions of idolatry 
critique to deﬂect attention from their inability to solve today’s pressing 
social, economic and ecological problems. Works like De Rijke and De 
Rooij’s Of Three Men, Killaars’s Figures, Van de Ven’s overpainted photos 
and Holleman’s magazine strongly suggest the need to effect a montage 
of various forms of critique—religious and secular as well as ‘Western’ 
and ‘Muslim’—in order to prevent them from becoming slogans in the 
culture wars staged by both religious and secular reactionaries. 
17 Bruno Latour, ‘Why Has Critique Run out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to 
Matters of Concern’, Critical Inquiry, vol. 30, no. 2, 2003–04. See also Bruno Latour, 
‘What is Iconoclash? Or Is There a World Beyond the Image Wars?’, in Latour and 
Peter Weibel, eds, Iconoclash: Beyond the Image Wars in Science, Religion and Art, 
Karlsruhe 2002, pp. 14–37.
